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Compensatory Damage Awards Should Not be
Remanded Despite Reversal of Judgment on
Separate Claims Where the Verdict Specifically
Enumerates the Damages Against Each Defendant
for Each Cause of Action: Paves v. Corson
CIVIL PROCEDURE - JURY AWARDS - JURY DETERMINATIONS - The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a compensatory damage
award should not be overturned where the verdict specifically
enumerates the damages against each defendant for each cause of
action unless it is clear the amount awarded resulted from some
improper influence.
Paves v. Corson, 801 A.2d 546 (Pa. 2002)
In 1986, while Sidonie Paves resided in Florida, she began to
fear for her safety as the result of a burglary at her home.' In the
fall of 1986, she traveled from her home in Florida to Pennsyl-
vania, where both her son and daughter lived.! She arrived at her
daughter's house on October 31, 1986.' Her son learned of her ar-
rival and met Paves at his sister's house." After declaring that she
wanted a relationship with her children, Paves expressed a desire
for their assistance in safeguarding $82,000 in checks.5 Immedi-
ately thereafter, Paves' son, who was a doctor, had her admitted to
Chestnut Hill Hospital.! While there, Paves began taking various
medications that her son prescribed for her.7 During her stay in
the hospital, Paves signed a will in which she left her entire estate
to her children.8 She also signed a power of attorney in favor of
1. Paves v. Corson (Paves I), 765 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
2. Id. Mrs. Paves had been estranged from her children, Barry and Carol Corson, for
approximately twenty years. Id. She traveled to Pennsylvania hoping to renew her rela-
tionship with them. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Paves 1, 765 A.2d at 1131. She brought the checks back with her from Florida. Id.
6. Id. at 1132. Paves' son had admitting privileges at Chestnut Hill Hospital in Penn-
sylvania. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Mr. Stewart Liebman, Esquire, who at the time was a neighbor and friend of
Barry Corson, drafted the will signed by Paves. Id.
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her son.' After her release from the hospital and during the next
five years, Paves resided with her daughter. ° Using the power of
attorney, Paves' son closed all of her remaining accounts, took con-
trol of the funds, and spent over $600,000 of Paves' money." In
addition, Paves' children sold her real estate, jewelry and other
personal property and kept the proceeds. 2 Finally in 1991, Paves
confronted her children about these matters and was subsequently
ejected from her daughter's home. 3
Paves filed suit in 1993 in the Court of Common Pleas of Phila-
delphia County, against her children seeking compensation for
conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, civil assault, battery, breach of
fiduciary relationship, breach of confidential relationship, undue
influence, equitable claims for constructive trust, and medical neg-
ligence. 4 At trial, a motion for directed verdict was granted, and
the court dismissed the claim of battery against Carol Corson, and
the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and civil
assault against both children. The remaining claims were sub-
mitted to the jury.6 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of
Paves. 7
On appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, the appellees
argued, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in refusing to
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the battery and
emotional distress claims and in failing to grant a remittitur on
9. Id. Although at that time Paves signed the power of attorney, she testified that she
did so because she was told that it was a second copy of the will. Id.
10. Paves v. Corson (Paves II), 801 A.2d 546, 547 (Pa. 2002).
11. Paves 1, 765 A.2d at 1132. Upon release from the hospital, Mrs. Paves and Barry
traveled to Florida where, using the power of attorney, he closed out all of Paves' remaining
accounts. Taking control of these funds, Barry then gave gifts to various family members,
including Carol and himself, and lent money to persons unknown to Paves and without her
permission. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Prior to trial, Paves withdrew the claims for constructive trust and medical
malpractice. Id.
15. Paves I, 765 A.2d at 1132.
16. Id.
17. Id. As against Dr. Barry Corson, the jury awarded battery $600,000; intentional
infliction of emotional distress $900,000; breach of fiduciary duty $375,916; breach of confi-
dential relationship $106,354; punitive damages $1,000,000; and conversion $41,000. Id.
As against Carol Corson, the jury awarded breach of confidential relationship $150,000;
intentional infliction of emotional distress $500,000; punitive damages $400,000; and con-
version $59,500. Id.
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certain compensatory and punitive damages. 8 More specifically,
they argued that the trial court erred in the following: (1) allow-
ing the battery claim against Barry Corson to go to the jury; (2)
allowing the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
to go to the jury in the absence of medical testimony to support the
claims; (3) allowing the conversion claims to go to the jury; (4) al-
lowing Paves to testify that she was "drugged," "confused," and
had other alleged effects of medications prescribed by Barry
Corson; (5) failing to strike the testimony of Paves' purported fo-
rensic accounting expert and failing to grant a new trial because of
his testimony; (6) giving an "adverse inference" instruction against
the appellants for their failure to produce certain documents; (7)
giving fraud and undue influence charges to the jury; (8) failing to
grant a remittitur on the verdict; and (9) allowing punitive dam-
ages on the claims of battery, conversion, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 9 The appellees also asserted that the addi-
tional claims of assault and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress were properly dismissed by the trial court." To challenge the
trial judge's grant of a directed verdict on these dismissed claims,
Paves cross-appealed.2
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part.2 The court concluded that while the con-
version claim was properly submitted to the jury, the trial court
erred in its submission of the claims for battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress to the jury.23 The court agreed that
Paves had introduced insufficient evidence in support of her
claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress
and ordered that the awards resulting from the error be vacated. 4
Also, in regard to the award of punitive damages, the court con-
cluded that because it could have been based in part on the claims
of intentional infliction of emotional distress or battery, both of
which had been overturned, it too had to be vacated. 5 The court
18. Paves 11, 801 A.2d at 548. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a judgment
rendered in favor on of one party despite a verdict in favor of the other party. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 847 (7th Ed. 1999).
19. Paves I, 765 A.2d at 1132.
20. Id.
21. Paves 1, 765 A.2d at 1132-33.
22. Id. at 1139.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court stated that "where punitive damages were assessed in the case with-
out regard to a specific cause of action, it is impossible to determine which portion of the
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remanded the matter for a new trial to reassess damages on the
remaining claims: conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
confidential relationship, and punitive damages.26 The court also
ordered a new trial to reassess compensatory damages on those
same claims."
Paves appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."8 The
court agreed to review the case to decide whether the superior
court erred in remanding the case for a new trial on both compen-
satory and punitive damages. 9 The court reversed the superior
court decision with regard to compensatory damages and re-
manded the matter, limiting it to the assessment of punitive dam-
ages on the surviving claims."
Writing for the majority, Justice Nigro recognized that because
the duty of assessing damages falls within the province of the jury,
generally, the court should not interfere with a compensatory
damage award unless it is clear that the amount awarded resulted
from some improper influence." The court also acknowledged that
in limited circumstances a compensatory damage award might
also be set aside due to a post verdict development which under-
mines the award's validity." The appellees fostered the argument
that the basis for an affirmation of the superior court's order for
remand on compensatory damages was provided by Smith and
Shiner.3 However, Justice Nigro rejected this argument stating
that, unlike the juries in Smith and Shiner, the jury in the instant
matter, issued a verdict that specifically enumerated the damages
against each of the defendants for each cause of action. 4 Justice
award was attributable to the emotional distress and battery claims that . . . were not
properly established." Id. at 1137.
26. Paves 1, 765 A.2d at 1139.
27. Paves 11, 801 A.2d at 548.
28. Id. at 546.
29. Id. at 548.
30. Id. at 550.
31. Id. at 548-49. Those methods of improper influence listed are caprice, prejudice,
partiality, or corruption. Id.
32. Paves 11, 801 A.2d at 549. Justice Nigro noted that in both Shiner v. Moriarty, 706
A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) and Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),
juries returned general unallocated compensatory damages awards. Paves 11, 801 A.2d at
549. However, in each appeal, there were certain causes of actions that were sustained and
others that were reversed. Id. This was done because the superior court held that it was
impossible to determine the portion of the award attributable to the remaining causes of
action. Id. In both Smith and Shiner, the courts remanded the matters on the issue of
compensatory damages in order for an award to be rendered which would reflect only the
damages for the causes of action sustained on appeal. Id.
33. Paves 11, 801 A.2d at 549.
34. Id.
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Nigro went further in stating that the rationale of Smith and
Shiner was inapplicable to the instant case because here the court
could refer to the verdict sheets and easily determine the damages
enumerated for each specific, surviving claim.35
Next, the court examined the appellees argument that the jury's
assessment of compensatory damages was interfered with by cer-
tain evidence admitted at trial in connection with the dismissed
claims of battery and emotional distress.36 Appellees believed it to
be impossible to determine whether the jury's consideration of this
testimony had any impact on the jury's consideration of the finan-
cial damages resulting from the breach of duty and conversion
claims .
The majority found no merit in this argument and took the op-
portunity to express its belief in the trust associated with juries'
ability to assess damages." Justice Nigro noted that the appellees
failed to introduce any evidence in the record that might support
their contention that there was some improper influence associ-
ated with the verdict.39 The court pointed out that the evidence
introduced at trial strongly suggested the contrary." In light of
the breakdown of damages on the verdict sheet, the court found
evidence of a thorough and thoughtful allocation among the spe-
cific claims.4' The majority concluded that there was a proper al-
location of damages.42
In further support of this conclusion, the majority next exam-
ined the lower court's instructions to the jury.43 After such exami-
nation, the court found those instructions to have clearly informed
the jury that the damages for breach of duty and conversion were
35. Id. Nigro stated that when the judgments on certain causes of actions were re-
versed, the Superior Court was not left with a single, unallocated damage award from
which it could not ascertain damages attributable to the surviving claims. Id.
36. Id. Paves testified regarding certain emotional and physical abuse caused by her
children. Id.
37. Appellees' Brief at 8, Paves v. Corson, 765 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (No. 00-
412 and 00-478). Appellees claim that because the jury had an inability to calculate the
damages on the breach of duty and conversion claims, the evidence was unduly prejudicial.
Paves H, 801 A.2d at 549.
38. Paves H, 801 A.2d at 549-50.
39. Id. at 550.
40. Id. Paves introduced evidence that the financial damages resulting from her al-
leged conversion and breach of duty claims exceeded $1,000,000. Id. The jury rendered a
verdict awarding over $730,000 on those claims and a separate award of $2,000,000 for the
claims of battery and emotional distress. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Paves H, 801 A.2d at 550.
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to remain separate and distinct from those for battery and emo-
tional distress.4 The majority declared that the trial court's dis-
tinction, which contrasted the damages of emotional distress and
battery as being such that could not be proven with mathematical
certainty and designed to compensate Paves for separate injuries,
as adequate.45 Justice Nigro, in reliance on the presumption that
juries generally follow the court's instructions, concluded that the
damages awarded for breach of duty and conversion were those
that could only be ascertained with a mathematical certainty and
not those whose purpose was to compensate for the effects of emo-
tional or physical abuse.4 6 The majority decided to reverse the su-
perior court's decision in regard to the new trial on compensatory
damages and to remand on the limited issue of assessing punitive
damages on the remaining claims.47
Justice Eakin, in his dissenting opinion, focused on the issue of
the jury assigning damages after hearing irrelevant and prejudi-
cial evidence of the two dismissed claims.48 Justice Eakin stated
that the evidence of the children battering their mother would
never be admitted without the existence of the battery count.49
Because the battery and the intentional infliction counts were
dismissed, Justice Eakin believed that a recalculation was war-
ranted without the contamination of the irrelevant, prejudicial
evidence.0 While Justice Eakin found the superior court's solution
of the matter to be well reasoned, he suggested that the determi-
nation of consequences be free from the influence of prejudicial
and irrelevant evidence.5 In conclusion, Justice Eakin suggested
that the new jury only be given evidence that is relevant to the
damages caused by the surviving counts.52 Therefore, the dam-
44. Id. The trial court made clear in its instructions that the alleged damages for
breach of duty and conversion were that which could be measured with certainty and if
awarded would serve as compensation for all the financial losses Paves suffered as a result
of the appellees' actions. Id.
45. Id. The trial court expressed that these damages were to compensate Paves for
physical pain, mental anguish, discomfort, inconvenience .... distress,... embarrassment
and humiliation. Id.
46. Id.
47. Paves H, 801 A.2d at 550 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 551. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
51. Id. This statement was made in reference to the evidence of the battery and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
52. Paves H, 801 A.2d at 551 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
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ages could be determined without the influence of the prejudicial
and irrelevant evidence of the dismissed claims.8
It is the province of the jury to assess testimony for its worth
and if the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the damages,
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.4
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entertained this issue as
early as 1922 in its decision of Brown v. Quaker City Cab Co.55
The plaintiff in Brown commenced an action in the Court of Com-.
mon Pleas of Philadelphia County, seeking compensation for inju-
ries sustained while she was a passenger in the defendant's cab."
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the defen-
dant appealed.57 On appeal, liability for the injury was not at is-
sue.18 Instead, the appellant questioned whether the court erred
in its reading to the jury a portion of the statement of claim.59
Based upon this error, the appellant argued that a new trial
should have been granted."0 The court however was not persuaded
and affirmed the judgment of the lower court.6 ' The court stated
that the verdict will be disturbed only if the evidence shows no
justification for the award rendered and it is so beyond reason
that it can be concluded that the amount was reached due to some
misconception of the law or evidence. Accepting the facts as true,
the court could not conclude that the verdict was excessive or
founded on an improper basis.
Later, in 1959, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clearly
communicated that the functions of the court do not include sub-
stituting their own judgment in place of the jury's, unless it is
warranted." The case before the court was Elza v. Chovan65 , in
which a passenger who sustained injuries as a result of an acci-
53. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
54. Elza v. Chovan, 152 A.2d 239 (Pa. 1959).
55. 117 A. 681 (Pa. 1922).
56. Id. at 681. The claim was based on the negligence of the driver, as the driver was
careless in running into the girder of a bridge crossing some railroad tracks. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The appellant did not deny this claim.
59. Id. The paragraph read to the jury contained a description of plaintiffs injuries.
Id. There was no mention of the amount of the claim. Id.
60. Brown, 117 A. at 681. The appellant believed the verdict was excessive as a result
of this error. Id.
61. Id. at 682.
62. Id. at 681.
63. Id. at 682.
64. Elza, 152 A.2d at 240.
65. 152 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1959).
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dent while on a motorcycle brought an action.66 The jury rendered
a verdict in favor of plaintiff; however, the court of common pleas
granted plaintiff a new trial for inadequacy of award.67 From this,
both defendants appealed.68 Upon appeal, the superior court re-
versed this decision and entered a judgment on the verdict, result-
ing in allocatur to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.69 While
the Supreme Court firmly acknowledged that within the province
of the jury lies the assessment of the testimony and the acceptance
or rejection of damages, it also declared that if the verdict does not
bear a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages, a distur-
bance of that verdict is warranted." The court ordered a new
trial, finding that the plaintiff proved damages in the amount of
$1,375 and that the jury's award of $950 was inadequate.7 Al-
though a new trial was granted, it was warranted for no other
reason except the inadequacy of the award.72 Without such, the
verdict would not have been disturbed by the court, and the prov-
ince of the jury was left untouched.73
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Tonik v.
Apex Garages, Inc, in which the standard of disturbance was fur-
ther defined.74 A jury rendered a $20,000 award in favor of a pe-
destrian who brought a personal injury claim against a Philadel-
phia business owner for injuries she sustained when she fell on a
sidewalk in front of the business' premises.75 At trial, the pedes-
trian introduced evidence that there was "a crack" in the pave-
ment in front of the premises, which was concealed by ice, and
that this existing negligent condition proximately caused her inju-
ries.76 The business owner challenged the award based on the con-
tention that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
negligence and was not proof as to what caused the pedestrian's
66. Id. at 239. The passenger brought suit against both the driver of the motorcycle
and the driver of the car that collided with the motorcycle. Id.
67. Id. at 238. The jury awarded $950.00 to the plaintiff, which was less than plain-
tiffs actual medical expenses. Id.
68. Id. "Allocatur" is used in Pennsylvania to denote permission to appeal. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 75 (7th Ed. 1999).
69. Elza, 152 A.2d at 238.
70. Id. at 240.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 275 A.2d 296 (Pa. 1971).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 298.
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fall." The court found that within the province of the jury lies the
duty of assessing damages and interference by the court is not
warranted without a clear showing that the award was the result
of caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other improper
influence.78 The majority explained that in light of all the facts
disclosed in the record, they could not see how the jury acted ca-
priciously or from some improper consideration.79 The jury's ver-
dict was sustained and no new trial was granted.0
Years later, a more defined standard was introduced by the Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania in the decision of Smith v. Renaut.8'
In Smith, the purchaser of real estate attempted to sue the seller,
brokering agency and salesman who sold her a piece of property
because of a failure to reveal the presence of severe termite dam-
age and a carcinogen in the well water. 2 After apportioning the
purchaser's damages, the jury rendered a verdict awarding both
compensatory and punitive damages in favor of the purchaser
from which the defendants appealed on the contention that insuf-
ficient evidence was introduced.83 Upon review, the court found
that while the purchaser submitted sufficient evidence in regard
to the termite damage, she had failed to present the same in prov-
ing her claim in relation to the chlordane in the well water.84
Upon reliance of this determination, the Superior Court concluded
that while the issues were submitted to the jury on instructions,
which would have allowed a recovery for both, the jury's verdict
did not define or label the damages that it chose to award. 5 The
77. Id. The Court of Common Pleas denied the owner's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, but ordered a new trial. Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged that
the burden was on the pedestrian to prove that the negligent condition existed on the side-
walk and proximately caused both the accident and her injury; however, it was concluded
that under the evidence, the question was one for the jury. Id.
78. Id. at 299.
79. Tonik, 275 A.2d at 299. The facts referred to were the serious injury suffered; the
length of time required for hospitalization and medical care; the long period of disability;
the pain and suffering; and the present decreased purchasing power of the dollar. Id.
80. Id.
81. 564 A.2d at 188.
82. Id. at 190. The carcinogen found in the well water was chlordane. Id. "Chlordane"
is a chlorinated, highly poisonous, volatile oil, formerly used as an insecticide. WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 258 (4th Ed. 1999).
83. Smith, 564 A.2d at 191. Jury ordered the salesman to pay $2,500 in punitive dam-
ages and the agency to pay punitive damages totaling $20,000. Id. Both defendants filed
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id.
84. Id. at 192. The Court determined that there was no evidence showing any misrep-
resentation made regarding the presence of the chlordane or that the defendants concealed
its presence in any way. Id.
85. Id. at 193.
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court acknowledged that the verdict probably included compensa-
tion for both the damage caused by the termites, as well as the
chlordane in the water.86 Because no definite conclusion could be
reached, the lower court decision was reversed and a new trial was
ordered.87 This decision added to the disturbance exceptions when
the jury's verdict is based on damage issues that were not sup-
ported by the evidence, but were submitted to the jury, coupled
with a valid issue, and the jury returns a verdict without defining
or labeling the damages it awarded.88
More recently, the superior court added a refining touch to this
disturbance standard in its decision of Sehl v. Vista Linen Rental
Services, Inc.89 The issue before the court was whether a new trial
was warranted based on the trial court's purported error to pre-
clude testimony and in its charge to the jury." In Sehl, a waitress
commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadel-
phia County against a launderer of a rug on which she slipped and
fell, and a party that began providing services after the accident
occurred." Although the jury awarded damages in favor of the
waitress, on the contention of inadequacy, the waitress appealed.92
In light of the evidence presented, the court was unable to con-
clude that the award was unreasonable and therefore affirmed the
judgment of the lower court.93 The superior court left the duty of
assessing damages within the province of the jury, but added that
disturbance shall not occur unless there is a clear showing that
the award resulted from prejudice, caprice, partiality, corruption
or some other improper influence.94
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania successfully applied the
appropriate standards in its decision of Paves v. Corson.95 Faced
with the difficulty of disturbing the jury's award, the Court ana-
lyzed all aspects thoroughly before it decided that a new trial was
warranted. The court correctly recognized that disturbance is not
warranted without proof of caprice, prejudice, partiality, corrup-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 194.
88. Smith, 564 A.2d at 190.
89. 763 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
90. Id. at 861.
91. Id. at 858.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 865.
94. Sehl, 763 A.2d at 864.
95. 801 A.2d 546 (Pa. 2002).
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tion or some other improper influence. 6 The application of this
well-known standard helped to determine that the evidence intro-
duced at trial accurately demonstrated the loss suffered by Ms.
Paves. The court properly concluded that the breakdown of the
damages on the verdict sheet, not only indicated a conscientious
consideration of the evidence presented, but also negated any
claim of improper influence. 7
The court also correctly analyzed the allocation of damages is-
sue. Before it decided that the jury properly allocated the dam-
ages, the court conducted a critical review of the lower court's in-
structions to the jury. In dispute was the allegation that the jury's
award was designed to compensate Ms. Paves for the effects of
emotional and physical abuse, both of which were dismissed
claims. However, the court correctly determined that the instruc-
tions to the jury were clear that the damages sought for breach of
duty and conversion were to remain separate from the damages
for emotional and physical abuse.9 8 These same instructions dis-
tinguished between those damages that could be proven with
mathematical certainty and those that could not.99 This emphasis
in the instructions signified that the trial court made a clear effort
to avoid any overlapping of damages. After analyzing such efforts,
the court accurately determined that the jury awarded damages
for the breach of duty and conversion claims, and not those of
abuse claims.
A well-respected trust for the jury system has been demon-
strated throughout the history of case law in Pennsylvania. The
court was able to incorporate that trust and couple it with a thor-
ough analysis of the issues before it. As a result, the historical
notion that the assessment of damages falls within the province of
the jury remains undisturbed.
Ayanna Lee
96. Id. at 549.
97. Id. at 550.
98. Id.
99. Id. In its instructions to the jury, the trial court explained that the damages sought
for emotional distress and battery could not be proven with mathematical certainty and
that only the damages for breach of duty and conversion constituted economic damages,
which could be measured with mathematical certainty. Id.
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